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T

he findings of journalist-soldier S. L. A. Marshall about combat fire ratios—particularly that in World War II less than 25 percent of American
combat infantrymen in battle fired their weapons—have been controversial
since Marshall published them in his 1947 book, Men Against Fire.1 He continued to apply his methodology—the after-action, group interview with enlisted
men—during the Korean War, where he concluded that more than half the
front-line soldiers were firing their weapons. In the past 20 years, Marshall’s
controversial figures have come under more intensive attack, in part because, after his death in 1977, his papers did not include statistical analyses or more than a
couple of the field notebooks produced during group interviews.2 Yet Marshall
continues to have supporters as well as detractors, and the controversy rages on,
fueled by emotional beliefs, individual vested interests, missing documents, and
absent statistics.3
One of the key questions concerns where Marshall obtained his figures
about the ratio of fire, the proportion of a rifle unit firing its weapons in battle.
Marshall claimed it was derived from his group after-action interviews, a method
he developed as a field historian in World War II and which as a civilian journalist, Reserve officer, and military consultant, he employed and advocated for use
by the US Army and later by the Israeli Defense Force. Although the ratio-of-fire
figure was his most famous product, Marshall was proudest of his methodology—informal, open-ended, group interviews of enlisted personnel, as soon as
possible after a particular combat action, to learn about the actual behavior of the
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soldiers in battle. Timing was sometimes but not always on his side. In the Pacific
in November 1943, he was with G.I.’s when a forward unit at Makin Island in the
Gilberts sustained a Japanese counterattack at night, and Marshall could interview American survivors the next day. But in the European Theater of Operations the following year, he was not able to interview the combat troops involved
in the Normandy Invasion in June 1944 until several weeks afterward.4 In each
case, however, he would interview the men and, he said, take contemporaneous
notes and later write up his report on the action.
The following oral history provides some fresh insights into Marshall’s
methodology and findings. It also raises troubling questions about the reliability
of Marshall’s statistics on fire ratios.
The oral history comes from a citizen-soldier, Frank J. Brennan, Jr.,
now a retired high school and community college history instructor and administrator. As a young junior officer in Korea in 1953, Brennan accompanied S. L. A.
Marshall on some of the journalist’s after-action group interviews along the Main
Line of Resistance, including the Battle of Pork Chop Hill.
A native of New Brunswick, New Jersey, Brennan graduated from
Rutgers in the spring of 1951 with a B.A. in journalism. Having completed
ROTC, he received a commission as a second lieutenant in the infantry. After additional training, including Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia (where
Marshall’s Men Against Fire was among the required reading), and in Japan, he
arrived in Korea in May 1952, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, a Regular
Army division that had been fighting in Korea since September 1950. Lieutenant
Brennan was sent to the front line with the 32d Infantry Regiment in the 7th Infantry Division’s central sector near the 38th Parallel. For six weeks on the line,
he served as a rifle platoon leader. His unit was engaged in patrols and in repelling attacks on its position along the Main Line of Resistance.
Perhaps partly because of his journalism degree, Brennan was assigned
to G-3 (Operations) at Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, in late July 1952. He
was subsequently promoted to first lieutenant. At G-3, Brennan’s main responsibility was to prepare the monthly reports of the division’s activity and send them
directly to Washington, D.C. Periodically he also served as a liaison officer with
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the press. He performed these functions under Major General Wayne C. Smith
and subsequently under Smith’s successor, Major General Arthur S. Trudeau.
During his tour of duty in Korea, Brennan was twice awarded the Bronze Star for
meritorious service.
In April 1953, there arrived at 7th Infantry Division a distinguished visitor: renowned military writer and analyst S. L. A. Marshall, syndicated columnist
for the Detroit News5 and brigadier general in the Army Reserve. This was Marshall’s second visit to Korea. Between December 1950 and April 1951, he had conducted after-action group interviews for the Army’s Operations Research Office.
Consequently, he concluded that in contrast to the 25 percent combat fire ratio he
had reported in World War II, in Korea, more than half of the combat infantrymen
were firing their weapons.6 Now, in the spring of 1953, on his second trip to Korea,
he came as a war correspondent, his visit cleared by the Pentagon and more directly by Eighth Army headquarters. But while most of the correspondents went to
the truce talks at Panmunjom, Marshall hurried to the 7th Division to visit an old
friend, General Trudeau.7 Thus Marshall was there when the Chinese Communists
initiated a series of combat actions, including the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, 16-18
April 1953, as they tested the resolve of the United Nations forces during the peace
negotiations.8 At 7th Division Headquarters, First Lieutenant Frank Brennan was
assigned to take Marshall wherever he wanted to go to talk to enlisted men who had
just been in combat engagements. As an escort officer, Brennan accompanied
Marshall on several of these group interviews and remembers them clearly. The
following are his recollections of S. L. A. Marshall’s after-action interviews.

Interview 9
AUTHOR: You told me that you knew who General S. L. A. Marshall was

because of his writings, but you were not prepared for what you saw when you
first met him. Would you explain that?
BRENNAN: I can remember his general appearance vividly, because it
was a shock to me. He was unique. His shirt was hanging out of his trousers, his
field jacket not buttoned in a military fashion, his combat boots dirty and
unshined. Haircut? Shave? No one believed he was a general officer! He didn’t
even have a helmet. We gave him a helmet. He had to have a helmet in a combat
zone. The first one we gave him had no star on it. He did have his star on his epaulet or on his fatigue jacket. And he certainly had status. He was a brigadier general, and he had been sent by Eighth Army Headquarters.
AUTHOR: Describe what you did with him.
BRENNAN: When he arrived at the division, he was assigned to me at one

point to escort him to locations that he selected. He would have a general idea of
where some of the serious action had taken place. At that point, it was not a flexible
or fluid action, but it was off the Main Line of Resistance. There were a number of
actions, including Pork Chop Hill. I know I got him to Pork Chop Hill either during
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or immediately after the battle. He would say exactly the type of thing he wanted,
and he would be escorted to the geographical area, where these things had taken
place. My job was to get him to these areas—and I remained with him until he was
finished—and then get him back safely to division headquarters.
AUTHOR: How long would all this take?
BRENNAN: We would leave division headquarters in a jeep. Sometimes

I would drive, sometimes we had a motor pool driver. Usually we would get there
in less than an hour. We would go to the unit. He would talk with the men involved. Usually not more than one to two hours. When he was finished, we would
go back to division headquarters. He would go to the commanding general’s
trailer—these were very large trailers with private offices and quarters—and
they talked.
AUTHOR: Give me a picture of what happened when you and Marshall

arrived in an area where there had just been combat.
BRENNAN: I brought him to the area. Then we would go to a unit involved
in a recent action. We would check through the company commander as a kind of
bureaucratic courtesy. The general said he wanted to see a group of men involved
in an action. They are gathered together in a bunker, and he and I go into it.
AUTHOR: Were there any local commanders present?
BRENNAN: When I was there, he only talked to the enlisted men and

NCOs. No officers. It was probably a mutual feeling. When a general comes into
an area and tries to find out what happened after an action, there is naturally the
suspicion by the officers involved in the action. “What is this general doing here?”
They avoided each other. He only talked to the NCOs and the enlisted men.
AUTHOR: You say the interviews were held in bunkers. Describe such a
bunker and the look of the men.
BRENNAN: It’s a sandbag bunker. It’s built with sandbags and the top is
covered. It’s located on the back of a ridge or hill. Inside are about half a dozen
enlisted men, sitting in a group. They’re haggard, perhaps sleepy. They probably
haven’t had a good night’s sleep. They’re probably relieved that they got out of
the action in one piece, and they must be wondering what this is all about.
AUTHOR: Did General Marshall interview casualties?
BRENNAN: No, he did not, just the men who were still on the line.
AUTHOR: Give me some details about how he went about his interviews

with those men.
BRENNAN: What he would do is request general information about the

military action and then he would interview—I accompanied him—interview
small groups of enlisted men who were involved in the action. Normally, I was
the only other person present with the men except him. I can vividly recall the setting in a bunker area proximate to an action area. His questions were very informally done. They were open-ended questions. He had a pad, a steno pad, and a
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pencil, and he would jot things down. He asked: “What did you see? Where were
you? What did others do?” Eliciting answers from them. These guys had been
away from the particular action for only a matter of hours, a day at most.
His approach, I found to be very effective. The question I asked him
was: “Is the information they’re providing really objective information, or are
they telling what they think a general officer wants to hear?” He said something
like “It’s the best we can do.” I was struck by the objectivity. And the men were so
close to the action themselves.
AUTHOR: How would he explain what he was doing?
BRENNAN: He would say: “We’re just trying to find out what hap-

pened.” He was nonaccusatory. He always reassured them of anonymity. He
would say to me in front of them: “No names.” I said, “Yes, Sir.”10
Then he would begin: “Where were you?” “What did you see?” What
did you do?” “Did you see any North Koreans or Chinese?”
AUTHOR: What kind of answers did the men give him?
BRENNAN: It’s difficult for me to recapture that part. I do recall his try-

ing to take an answer from one man and put it together with an answer from another G.I. and trying to get a comprehensive answer from the whole. He was
trying to reconstruct the battle.
AUTHOR: What about the issue of men firing their weapons?
BRENNAN: I remember he brought up the question but that he did not

push it in regard to the amount of firing. That came up incidentally rather than as a
result of a specific question from him. He asked mostly open-ended questions to
elicit information about what really occurred.
AUTHOR: You said you knew his book and its assertions about limited
firing. Did you and he discuss it?
BRENNAN: I know we discussed the conclusions in his book, Men
Against Fire. I asked him specifically whether those percentages of his—25 or 30
per cent of the men firing their weapons—were supportable. He assured me that
they were supportable, talking to the soldiers at the time.
AUTHOR: What did you mean by supportable?
BRENNAN: I meant was there any attempt to quantify the percentage

that he presented in his book, and he said . . . [Brennan paused for thought, then
continued]. You know, John, I’m not sure that I got a definite answer from him.
I’m just not sure.
AUTHOR: You were a rifle platoon leader in combat in Korea. What did

you observe about your own men firing?
BRENNAN: The people I had out on patrol, where most of the firing occurred, they fired pretty consistently after they were told to. It is difficult for me
to put a percentage on it, but it was significant. I certainly remember that the first
time I tried to fire, I had a carbine, and it wouldn’t fire. It jammed. After that, I
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brought a regular M-1 with me. In front of the Main Line of Resistance, we had
barbed wire, booby traps, and when you heard noise out there, that attracted fire
from us, but the main firing was out on patrol. They did need more ammunition
when they returned, so they must have been firing their weapons.
AUTHOR: When Marshall interviewed the men, was he taking notes?
BRENNAN: The general had a steno pad and pencil. He took down cryp-

tic notes. Not lots of notes. Not verbatim. He’d listen to them, and he’d take a few
notes occasionally.
I do recall he was pushing very hard to have this type of reporting incorporated in the reports, and I think the general [Marshall] wanted to know what
was being done with his after-action reports after he wrote them. I am not very
clear about what was done with these. He tried to emphasize to me that these
after-action reports that he was so known for should be included in our monthly
reports sent from division. They would be valuable. He must have talked to the
division commander about this, because the division commander [General Trudeau] talked to me too.
The end result was that we sometimes did include these things. I went
down [to the front] and did what he did and included some of this. But the problem was the time and the difficulty of incorporating these things, which had to be
signed off by the division commander. The end result was that only from time to
time on a limited extent were they done and included.
AUTHOR: What happened to those after-action reports that General
Marshall wrote after you and he went to the attack areas?
BRENNAN: I don’t know. After I left him with the commanding general
of the division, I never found out. He did not show me the reports he wrote. I
never did see any.
AUTHOR: How long were you with General Marshall?
BRENNAN: Well, it was not weeks. There were at least two or three spe-

cific occasions in which I was involved.
AUTHOR: After you left Korea in July 1953 where did you go?
BRENNAN: I rotated back to the states. I was mustered out through

Camp Kilmer . . . in July 1953.11 I went back to Rutgers on the G.I. Bill and earned
a master’s degree in history. I taught history at South Brunswick High School and
Ocean County Community College [both in New Jersey] and later became business administrator for the South Brunswick School District. [End of Interview]

Considering the Comments
In regard to the controversy over Marshall’s methods and findings, Frank
Brennan’s recollections, while supporting the effectiveness of the journalist’s
method for recreating the battle experiences of small groups of enlisted men, cast
doubt about the validity of Marshall’s controversial assertions about fire ratios.
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Brennan’s oral history indicates that Marshall’s interviews typically
occurred during daylight hours in bunkers, lasted for one or two hours, never included unit officers or casualties, and that Brennan believed Marshall’s interviews were very effective at recreating the engagement. Brennan’s account
provides support to Marshall’s own assertion that he made contemporaneous
notes in field notebooks as a part of his after-action group interviews with soldiers. But as Brennan recalls, these were at most sporadic, cryptic notes, not detailed accounts. In fact only a few of Marshall’s notebooks have been found.12
There may not be any more. Frank Brennan’s memory of the nature of the military journalist’s questioning also suggests that Marshall, at least by the Korean
War, was primarily trying to recreate the battle experience of the common soldier
rather than to elicit any single piece of data such as the fire ratio.
Brennan’s account also reinforces the contention of critics of Marshall’s use of statistics, who conclude that Marshall was unscientific in his methodology and that his figures about the percentage of troops firing their weapons
were either sloppy, fabricated, or simply guesswork.13 During the interviews,
Marshall took only minimal notes, which suggests that the journalist was mainly
putting the reconstruction of the battle together initially in his mind rather than
on paper. How much time elapsed before he wrote a full description of the combat
action remains unknown, but it could easily have been long enough for some details to be misremembered or lost entirely.
Nor does Brennan’s account of Marshall’s questions offer reason to put
much faith in the journalist’s judgments about the percentages of men firing their
weapons. It was not a question he asked of every soldier. Instead, it emerged
rather incidentally in the open-ended discussion among the group as Marshall
sought primarily to reconstruct what had happened in the engagement, rather
than who fired and who did not. Nevertheless, unlike the recollection of the Army
captain who accompanied Marshall in Europe in World War II that he could not
recall Marshall ever asking who had fired his weapon, Brennan does recall the
journalist occasionally asking that question directly in his interviews in Korea.14
While Marshall defended his findings from Men Against Fire to Brennan as what
he had learned from talking to front-line soldiers, Marshall himself seems to have
realized the questionable objectivity of much of the information he acquired. The
journalist’s written accounts of his experiences, such as at Pork Chop Hill,
tended to exaggerate portions of the actual events for dramatic effect.
Unquestionably, Marshall’s claims that many soldiers were not firing
their rifles brought the attention of the public and the Army to this issue. Those
claims contributed to analysis and improvements in infantry training designed to
increase rates of fire. As Roger J. Spiller of the Army’s Combat Studies Institute
has written, the variables in when and why troops fire or do not fire their weapons
in certain combat situations involve the kind of terrain, the nature of particular
circumstances, the types of weapons, and the trajectory of a soldier’s time in
combat.15 But without further corroboration, the source of Marshall’s contenAutumn 2003
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tions about shockingly low fire ratios at least in some US Army divisions in
World War II appears to have been based at best on chance rather than scientific
sampling, and at worst on sheer speculation.
It seems most probable that Marshall, writing as a journalist rather than
as a historian, exaggerated the problem and arbitrarily decided on the one-quarter
figure because he believed that he needed a dramatic statistic to give added
weight to his argument.16 The controversial figure was probably a guess. If First
Lieutenant Frank Brennan’s experience accompanying Marshall on after-action,
group interviews in Korea in 1953 is typical, however, even if more of Marshall’s
field notebooks are found, they probably will not contain the kind of data necessary to substantiate the controversial assertions of Men Against Fire.
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